India faces a critical and historic decision regarding Bangladesh’s request to extradite former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was sentenced to death in absentia by the country’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) on October 17.
Instead of refusing the request or providing her shelter, New Delhi could use this moment to strategically recalibrate its relationship with Dhaka. This recalibration must be grounded in principle and long-term goals.
India should consider facilitating a mediated return for Hasina while also expanding its focus beyond her and the Awami League to build more durable, people-oriented ties with Bangladesh.
The gravity of the tribunal’s verdict against Sheikh Hasina is undeniable. The ICT found she ordered lethal force during the 2024 student-sparked uprising, utilizing drones, helicopters and live ammunition, resulting in an estimated 1,400 deaths according to the United Nations.
Despite Dhaka’s firm extradition request under their shared 2013 treaty, New Delhi has responded cautiously and diplomatically. India’s reluctance is likely more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging and suggests it has legitimate legal grounds to delay.
Crucially, the bilateral treaty contains a “political offense” exception and India’s own Extradition Act permits the discretionary refusal of requests deemed politically motivated or those involving human rights risks.
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Many Indian analysts view the current extradition request, and to a large extent the entire trial process, as fundamentally political. They argue that handing Hasina over would inadvertently legitimize a regime in Dhaka they see as detrimental to New Delhi’s interests.
Given this complex political context, a mediated return would be the most constructive path forward. To make this possible, India should demand full transparency from Dhaka, including access to tribunal evidence and assurance that international fair-trial standards, especially for trials conducted in absentia, were rigorously met.
Pressing for transparency and international standards not only fulfills India’s domestic legal obligations but also signals clearly to Dhaka that New Delhi is acting in the name of justice and institutional strength, not blind loyalty to a former ally.
If extradition is declined, India’s refusal must be dignified and legally defensible, publicly articulating its rationale by citing treaty exceptions, potential procedural flaws, rights-to-life guarantees and concerns over political persecution.
Refusing extradition under these circumstances would not be shirking responsibility but a careful, measured use of legal safeguards. If Bangladesh remains insistent, India could propose a constructive alternative: a monitored accountability mechanism, possibly involving third parties or international observation, rather than a simple outright refusal.
Crucially, while New Delhi addresses the Hasina extradition question, it must simultaneously reshape its long-term diplomatic posture, moving away from its long-standing reliance on Hasina and her Awami League political party.
India must recognize and engage with the emergence of a “nooton Bangladesh” (new Bangladesh), a nation some analysts argue is now defined by its populace rather than dynastic politics.
The current political climate is pivotal. Hasina’s overthrow and replacement by an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, who had already articulated his intention to build a forward-looking relationship with India, underscore this shift.
With a possible election date in February next year and a return to parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, India should begin preparing for a bilateral reset.
Focusing solely on Hasina risks trapping India in a zero-sum relationship with her Awami League, a party that may or may not return to its former dominance at the ballot box. India should instead pivot to strengthening people-to-people ties in education, trade, culture and border-region development.
By supporting civil society, youth and student networks and local governments in Bangladesh, India can build a durable foundation of trust that will endure future shifts in political power in Dhaka.
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This approach could also boost India’s soft-power standing in Bangladesh. By prioritizing the welfare of the Bangladeshi people over the politics of the ruling elite, New Delhi can reposition itself as a genuine partner for Bangladesh’s future rather than remaining tied to its Hasina-led past.
To be sure, risks do exist. Facilitating Hasina’s return could trigger a domestic backlash in Bangladesh, while refusing extradition might inflame anti-India public sentiment in Dhaka. Meanwhile, cultivating deeper societal ties will take time before yielding clear geopolitical returns.
Still, these risks are manageable and justified: They are worth taking precisely because they are grounded in a long-term strategy rather than driven by short-term political convenience.
Legally and politically, India is probably not obliged to deliver Hasina on a silver platter. But if it handles this moment wisely, India could turn the Hasina crisis into an opportunity to pivot toward more forward-looking and resilient bilateral relations, grounded not in the politics of personality but in partnership between peoples.
Abu Jakir is a journalist based in Dhaka.
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